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Non-technical Summary 
 
The measurement of integration is of considerable policy relevance.  For example, the 
European Central Bank mission statement reads: “We in the Eurosystem have as our primary 
objective the maintenance of price stability for the common good.  Acting also as a leading 
financial authority, we aim to safeguard financial stability and promote European financial 
integration” (italics added).  
 
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are 
rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there 
is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking.  Data on 
cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no 
evidence of integration in retail banking.  This paper shows that the previous tests of bank 
integration are weak, because they are not based on an equilibrium concept. They do not 
consider the possibility that due to violations of the Modligliani-Miller assumptions, demand 
for financial services may differ across countries. For example, if corporate income taxes 
differ, based on the trade-off theory of capital structure, firms would have different target 
capital ratios. This in turn implies that they demand different amounts of debt and exhibit 
different risk characteristics. Hence, we would observe a violation of the law of one price 
even if markets are perfectly integrated. Hence, this paper argues that the previous tests are 
neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration.   
 
The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks’ profitability. 
Banks profitability should converge in integrated markets as contestability or entry will result 
in high profits being competed away. Further, a functioning market for corporate control will 
ensure that weak banks will either disappear or be taken over by stronger banks. Hence, the 
new test identifies the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in 
banking integration.  Unlike previous tests of integration, therefore, the test proposed in this 
paper emphasises the link between integration and efficiency: integration is only to the extent 
desirable as it results in a more efficient provision of banking services. A monopolist, while 
obviously “integrated”, would not provide banking services efficiently. 
 
The results, using RoA or RoE as a measure of bank profitability, suggest that European listed 
banks profitability appears to converge to a common level.  There is weak evidence that 
competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show 
improved profitability.  Hence, both contestability and the market for corporate control appear 
to be operational for listed European banks. Unlisted European banks, savings banks and 
cooperative banks differ markedly.  Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common 
target rate of profitability.  Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being 
integrated. This is true not only across Europe, but also within individual European countries: 
Even within countries, listed banks do not appear to be integrated with unlisted commercial 
banks, savings banks and cooperative banks. 
 
We also estimated the model for U.S. banks as a benchmark.  In the U.S. both listed and 
unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their 
profits driven down quickly.  However, there is no evidence of a market for corporate control 
driving out weak unlisted banks even in the U.S.. Still, using our measure of integration, the 
U.S. banking market appears significantly more integrated than the banking market in the 
E.U.. 
 
The evidence presented in the paper is consistent with earlier evidence on cross-border bank 
mergers and contagion among listed banks, both of which appears to have increased since the 
introduction of the common currency. However, unlisted commercial banks, savings and 
cooperative banks constitute about 50% of total assets of the banking systems of the major 
European countries studied here and the retail market share may be even larger.  The 
governance of these banks is not subject to the same mechanisms as the governance of listed 
banks.  The evidence shows that they neither respond to competitive pressures as much as 
listed commercial banks, nor do these banks face pressure to remedy underperformance 
through a threat of takeover.  These rigidities remain in place, and as far as we can see, would 
be unaffected by the introduction of the common currency.  
 
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Finanzintegration hat eine hohe Priorität in der Wirtschaftspolitik in Europa. 
Finanzintegration ist, zum Beispiel, ein Bestandteil des Mission Statements der Europäischen 
Zentralbank: „Wir im Eurosystem haben als unser primäres Ziel Preisstabilität als unser 
Beitrag zur öffentlichen Wohlfahrt. Da wir auch die führende Finanzauthorität sind, ist es 
außerdem unser Ziel Finanzstabilität zu erhalten und europäische Finanzintegration zu 
fördern (kursiv hinzugefügt). 
 
Die meisten Beobachter sind der Meinung dass nach der Einführung der gemeinsamen 
Währung ein schneller Integrationsprozess für Geldmärkte und die Märkte für 
Regierungsanleihen im Gange ist, so scheint ein ähnlicher Integrationsprozess für 
Bankprodukte nicht stattzufinden. Daten über grenzübergreifende Kredit und 
Depositenvolumen, grenzübergreifende Bankenzusammenschlüsse und für das „Law of one 
price“ zeigen wenig bis keine Tendenzen zur Integration. Dieses Papier zeigt, dass diese 
Integrationstests allerdings wenig aussagekräftig sind, da sie nicht auf einem 
Gleichgewichtskonzept basieren. Das heißt, diese Tests berücksichtigen nicht die Möglichkeit 
dass aufgrund von Verletzungen der Modigliani-Miller Annahmen, die Nachfrage nach 
Finanzdienstleistungen Länder übergreifend heterogen sein kann. Wenn zum Beispiel 
Körperschaftssteuern in einzelnen Ländern unterschiedlich sind, dann würden Firmen, 
basierend auf der trade-off Theorie der Kapitalstruktur, unterschiedliche 
Zielfremdkapitalrelationen haben. Das wiederum impliziert, dass Firmen unterschiedliche 
Mengen Fremdkapital nachfragen und unterschiedliche Risikocharakteristika haben. All das 
sind Argumente warum man möglicherweise den „law of one price“ ablehnen würde, selbst 
wenn die Märkte vollständig integriert wären. Wir argumentieren daher in diesem Papier, dass 
die vorherigen Tests weder notwendige noch hinreichende Bedingungen für 
Bankenintegration sind. 
 
Dieses Papier schlägt deshalb einen neuen Bankenintegrationstest vor, nämlich 
Gewinnkonvergenz. Die Gewinne von Banken sollten in integrierten Märkten konvergieren, 
da freier Marktzugang dazu führt, dass übermäßig hohe Gewinne durch Wettbewerb reduziert 
werden. Weiterhin, funktionierende Märkte für Unternehmenskontrolle („markets for 
corporate control“) würden sicherstellen, dass schwache Banken entweder vom Markt 
verschwinden, z.B. weil sie von stärkeren Banken übernommen werden. Unser Test betont 
daher die Bedeutung eines freien Marktzuganges und dem Funktionieren des Marktes für 
Unternehmenskontrolle. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Tests zeigt der Test in diesem Papier klar 
die Verbindung zwischen Bankenintegration und Effizienz: Integration ist nur dann 
wünschenswert wenn es zu einer effizienteren Bereitstellung von Bankendienstleistungen 
führt. Ein Monopolist hieße zwar vollkommene Integration, aber auch, dass Dienstleistungen 
nicht effizient bereitgestellt werden würden. 
 
Die Ergebnisse mit RoA oder RoE als das Maß für Bankenprofitabilität zeigen, dass der 
Gewinn öffentlich gehandelter Banken konvergiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass 
Wettbewerb zwar Gewinne eliminiert, dieser Effekt aber relativ schwach ist. Der Gewinn 
unprofitabler Banken tendiert nach oben. Insgesamt scheint sowohl Wettbewerb als auch der 
Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle für öffentlich gehandelte Banken operational zu sein. Die 
Ergebnisse für Geschäftsbanken, die nicht öffentlich gehandelt werden, sowie für Sparkassen 
und Volksbanken weichen stark von dem Ergebnis für öffentlich gehandelten Banken ab. Die 
Gewinne dieser Banken zeigen keine Tendenz in Richtung einer Zielgewinnrelation. 
Insgesamt scheint der  Bankenmarkt in Europe nicht integriert zu sein, und zwar nicht nur, 
wenn man Europa als Ganzes betrachtet, sondern auch innerhalb einzelner Länder. Öffentlich 
gehandelte und alle anderen Banken sind selbst innerhalb einzelner Länder nicht integriert. 
 
Als Referenzpunkt wurde das Modell auch für die USA geschätzt. In den USA konvergieren 
gehandelte und nicht gehandelte Banken in Richtung des gleichen Gleichgewichtpunkts. Für 
alle Banken sorgt starker Wettbewerb dafür, dass hohe Gewinne schnell reduziert werden. 
Allerdings finden wir auch in den USA nicht, dass der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle 
schwache, nicht gehandelte Banken eliminiert. Insgesamt aber erscheint der amerikanische 
Bankenmarkt signifikant integrierter als der europäische. 
 
Die Ergebnisse dieses Papiers sind konsistent mit anderen Papieren, die gezeigt haben dass 
trans-nationale Zusammenschlüsse von Banken und Kontagion seit Einführung des Euros 
zugenommen haben. Allerdings besteht der europäische Bankensektor, insbesondere in den 
großen europäischen Ländern, zu ungefähr 50% aus ungehandelten Banken, Sparkassen und 
Volksbanken und der Marktanteil im Endkundengeschäft ist wahrscheinlich noch höher. 
Diese Banken sind nicht den gleichen Anpassungsmechanismen ausgesetzt wie gehandelte 
Banken. Diese strukturellen Rigiditäten sind durch die Einführung des Euros nicht beeinflusst 
worden. 
 
 
 
A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe1 
 
Reint Gropp 
European Business School and Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
 
Anil K Kashyap  
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
 
 
November 2008 
 
 
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are 
rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there 
is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking.  Data on 
cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no 
evidence of integration in retail banking.  This paper shows that the previous tests of bank 
integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither 
necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration.  The paper proposes a new test of 
integration based on convergence in banks’ profitability.  The new test emphasises the role of 
an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration.  European 
listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level.  There is weak evidence that 
competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show 
improved profitability.  Unlisted European banks differ markedly.  Their profits show no 
tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability.  Overall, the banking market in 
Europe appears far from being integrated.  In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted 
commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits 
driven down quickly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we propose a new approach for assessing banking integration in Europe. The 
measurement of integration is of considerable policy relevance. For example, the European 
Central Bank mission statement reads: “We in the Eurosystem have as our primary objective 
the maintenance of price stability for the common good. Acting also as a leading financial 
authority, we aim to safeguard financial stability and promote European financial 
integration” (italics added). The ECB (2007) defines financial integration by saying “The 
market for a given set of financial instruments or services to be fully integrated when all 
potential market participants in such a market (i) are subject to a single set of rules when they 
decide to deal with those financial instruments or services, (ii) have equal access to this set of 
financial instruments or services, and (iii) are treated equally when they operate in the 
market.”  
This definition has direct implications for how banking integration should be measured. For 
instance, the equal access condition presumes that it is profitable for all services to be offered 
in all markets. This is akin to requiring that if there is demand for a service it must be met 
everywhere within an economic area at the lowest cost at which it can be provided anywhere 
within that area. This seems a useful benchmark for bond or wholesale banking markets, but 
much less relevant for locally provided retail banking services. Unless bank cost structures are 
identical across local communities some services might not be offered in some locations. This 
is not informative about financial integration. 
The equal treatment provision is also unusual because it includes no efficiency benchmark. As 
an extreme example, consider the case of a monopolist supplying financial services far above 
marginal cost. This would satisfy the ECB definition, but clearly would not be efficient and 
we doubt would be viewed as acceptable by policymakers.  
The common problem highlighted by both these observations is that market conditions 
depend on both supply and demand. The ECB definition pays insufficient attention to the 
supply side of the market. Existing empirical work (as represented by Cabral et al., 2002; 
Baele et al., 2004; Adam et al., 2002, ECB 2008) also suffers to certain extent from the same 
criticism. 
Previous research assessing integration has been of three varieties. One looks at the extent of 
cross-border direct retail operations of banks (Gual, 2004, Perez et al., 2005). These data are 
tracked by the Bank for International Settlements and suggest that while wholesale or money 
market flows across borders within the euro area are large, retail flows are generally less than 
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1 percent of total lending. This is taken as evidence against retail banking integration, 
although most authors would concede that cross-border retail flows do not constitute a 
necessary condition for retail banking integration to take place. One could easily imagine a 
financial system in which we would observe a complete absence of cross-border retail flows, 
but which would be perfectly integrated. For example, the threat of such flows could be 
enough to ensure perfect integration. 
A second indicator is cross-border bank mergers (see most recently Köhler (2007) and Köhler 
(2009), for evidence on this and a review of this literature). The absence of such deals, say in 
comparison to the number of domestic bank mergers, has also been taken as evidence against 
retail bank integration. Of course, similar arguments apply in this case as for cross-border 
retail flows and cross-border mergers are likely to be neither necessary, nor sufficient for 
financial integration to take place.  
The third method for detecting integration comes from Adam et al.’s (2002) study of retail 
interest rates. They look at 5 year corporate loans and mortgage loans and find lending rates 
barely converge after 1999. In a partial adjustment model the speed of convergence is only 
2% per year for corporate rates and 7% for mortgage rates. Based on this slow rate of 
convergence, they conclude that retail banking markets are far from integrated and do not 
seem to be on a path towards integration.  
The ECB’s annual Financial Integration Report (2008) reports extensive descriptive 
information, such as the cross-country standard deviation of interest rates on various bank 
products to argue that retail bank markets are not integrated. Affinito and Farabullini (2009) 
show that interest rate dispersion is reduced after controlling for variables reflecting the 
characteristics of domestic borrowers, such as risk exposure, disposable income, firm size, 
etc. They also demonstrate that price dispersion is larger across the euro area than across 
regions in Italy. They conclude that “euro area prices appear different because national 
banking products appear different or because they are differentiated by national factors”. We 
argue that this same reasoning implies that interest rate dispersion is a poor guide to judging 
integration. Indeed, we will present examples that show that interest rate dispersion may be 
completely unrelated to banking integration. 
The starting point for our analysis is a reconsideration of the relevance of the law of one price 
in this context. We argue that the law of one price in retail banking, the way it has been 
applied in the previous literature, constitutes neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for 
retail banking integration. The reason is the high degree of heterogeneity in demand for retail 
bank products that may arise from differences in tax systems, preferences, risk characteristics 
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or other demand side related factors (section 2). Once we admit that there are legitimate 
reasons why demand might differ across markets, then even with a single supply curve prices 
would differ. Yet, these price differences would not represent a failure of integration.  
In section 3, we propose a new test of retail bank integration in the spirit of Stigler (1963) 
which we argue constitutes a sufficient condition for banking integration. Our notion of 
integration presumes new entry and takeovers will lead to a convergence in profitability. This 
way of looking at integration shifts the focus to looking at barriers to entry and takeovers and 
to comparisons of profit rates rather than prices of banking products. The remainder of the 
paper explores whether integration in this sense holds. 
In section 4, we describe the data we use to carry the test of our condition. This sample 
consists of 36,000 observations on banks in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the U.S and the 
U.K between 1994 and 2006. The sample includes listed and unlisted banks and also includes 
many savings and cooperative banks. We show that average profitability varies widely among 
bank types (listed, unlisted) in Europe, but not in the U.S. Further, even within listed and 
unlisted banks, profitability varies widely across countries in Europe. 
In section 5, we estimate a partial adjustment model to assess convergence. The logic of our 
test suggests investigating whether profit rates converge and whether the tendency towards 
convergence depends on the strength of the market for corporate control. Hence publicly 
traded banks should be under different pressure than unlisted banks. 
We find this to be the case. Listed banks in Europe and U.S. each show a tendency to revert to 
the average profit rates in their respective areas. The non-listed commercial banks in the U.S. 
that are unusually profitable tend to have these profits competed away – but underperforming 
non-traded banks do not seem to improve. The profit rates of the unlisted commercial banks 
in Europe show no tendency to converge to any type of European average; there is some 
evidence profit rates for unlisted banks converge to a country-specific average. We read these 
patterns as suggesting U.S. banking market is reasonably well integrated, but that the banking 
market in Europe appears to be far from being integrated. We close this section with some 
thoughts on the relationship between the introduction of the common currency in the euro 
area and banking integration. 
Section 6 offers some final thoughts on how the results might inform future policy discussions 
regarding financial integration.  
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2. The law of one price revisited 
 
Intuitively, assessing integration using the law of one price seems appealing. Indeed, for many 
financial instruments such as government bonds, or high grade corporate securities, checking 
for the convergence of prices is standard practice. In the case of bank products, however, 
heterogeneity that invariably is present will undermine this type of comparison. Banks offer 
highly differentiated products to their customers, which may frequently be tailored towards 
their specific life circumstances, preferences, risk characteristics and needs. Unless one 
accurately controls for these differences, which may very likely systematically differ across 
countries, the law of one price will not send a clear message regarding the state of integration.  
 
[Chart 1 about here] 
 
We illustrate this point in two ways. Chart 1 shows our understanding of the standard view of 
financial integration that underlies law-of-one-price tests using generic supply and demand 
schedules. This characterization presumes that there is a single demand (curve which is 
common across markets and customers) and different supply curves. The standard view 
presumes that if we observe more than one price for a similar product (as in the chart with P1, 
P2 and P3), then this is evidence for market segregation and a lack of integration. In the 
language of the ECB definition of integration the equal treatment of customers across markets 
would not be satisfied since identical customers are facing different prices.  
The logic behind the ECB definition would be that the common set of regulatory rules would 
lead supplier S1 to capture the market, because she is the low cost provider of the financial 
service. So she should supply Q3 and the prevailing market price should be P3. Under these 
circumstances the law of one price will give an accurate picture of the degree of financial 
integration.  
 
[Chart 2 about here] 
 
Now consider Chart 2.  Again, we would observe multiple prices (P1, P2, P3). But in Chart 2, 
there is only one supply curve and the observed violation of the law of one price is due to 
unobserved heterogeneity in demand. The demand variation may be a function of differences 
in preferences, risk characteristics or other demand characteristics in different markets 
(countries). In this case, all of the conditions required under the ECB definition of integration 
might hold.  
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Thus, as a purely logical matter, tests for the law of one price implicitly assume that demand 
for bank’s products is homogeneous across markets and products.2 If there were sufficient 
harmonization across countries of all the factors that might lead to violations of the pre-
conditions for capital structural irrelevance, then perhaps this assumption might be 
reasonable. 3 But we know statutory corporate tax rates differ considerably, and effective rates 
show even larger differences; for instance, Mintz (2006) reports that effective average 
corporate tax rates in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are 32.1%, 38.1%, 30.2% and 23.2%. 
So based purely on differences in the tax advantages of interest deductibility, the preference 
for debt versus equity financing should differ in these countries. Consequently, there is no 
reason to expect demand for bank loans to be equalized and hence prices on bank loans to 
converge. 
On top of the tax issues, the large literature on differences on the effectiveness in corporate 
governance across countries, imply potentially differential benefits of debt financing to 
control agency costs. These considerations would generate further variation in the demand for 
debt, and likely the monitoring provided by banks.  
Once demand differences are acknowledged, deciding how to describe the state of market 
integration becomes much more difficult. The well known literature on price discrimination 
following from Varian (1985) suggests that prices would likely differ in the presence of cross-
market differences in demand. This may or may not entail any efficiency or welfare costs. 
One way to see the subtleties involved is to suppose that the ultimate source demand 
differences can be traced to variation in the costs that different customers face in searching for 
credit. This seems like a plausible benchmark in the context of many retail bank products. In 
this case, the large body of research dating back to Salop and Stiglitz (1982) becomes 
relevant. These models of spatial competition describe conditions under which price 
dispersion for identical goods can arise in equilibrium. In this case, even within countries 
prices would not converge. Note that in this class of models, financial service firms would 
enter the market and drive profit rates down to the level of the entry cost. In this case there 
would be no inefficiencies in the market, despite the price dispersion. 
                                                 
2 For an argument along similar lines, see Perez et al. (2005). 
3 One can summarize the necessary conditions for the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevance as 
requiring that i) investors and firms can trade the same set of securities at competitive market prices equal to the 
present value of their future cash flows; ii) there are no taxes, transactions costs, or issuance costs associated 
with security trading; iii) a firm’s financing decisions do not change the cash flows generated by its investments, 
nor do they reveal new information about them.  See Berk and DeMarzo (2007) Chapter 14 for further details. 
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For all these reasons, it seems to us the conditions needed to construct an informative test for 
integration based on the law of one price are very unlikely to prevail. Hence, we look for a 
different type of test. 
3. Return on assets as a measure of bank integration 
 
Stigler (1963) kicked off a large literature in industrial organization based on the observation 
that in equilibrium (with well functioning markets) the expected returns of comparable assets 
in an economy should be similar. Stigler’s empirical work (and all of the subsequent work 
which we have found, such as Fama and French (2000)), has been conducted using non-
financial businesses. We explore whether the returns on assets of banks across different 
markets/countries converge and suggest that convergence of profitability is a preferable 
measure of financial integration to the law of one price.  
Convergence would only be expected if the structure of the retail banking industry is such that 
(i) product markets are contestable and (ii) the market for corporate control operates 
efficiently across markets.4 While neither of these conditions has received much attention in 
the discussion over retail banking integration, they seem to be essential pre-conditions for an 
integrated equilibrium. More specifically, if these two conditions hold, the implications for 
the return on assets of banks in different countries are straightforward. If a bank earns rents in 
a market, the threat of a new entrant should drive down these rents towards the equilibrium 
value. If a bank underperforms in a market, a more efficient competitor should take this bank 
over, driving returns on assets up towards the equilibrium value. 
We should emphasise that contestability and a functioning market for corporate control are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for financial integration to take place. For example, 
consider the hypothetical monopoly supplier that we argued earlier might satisfy the ECB 
definition of integration. If this monopolist were faced with a threat of takeover (possibly 
from outside the euro area) and the market was contestable, then the banking services would 
be provided efficiently at marginal cost. Profits would converge and we would identify the 
market as integrated.  Conversely, if there was not any takeover pressure, or if the market 
could not be captured by a competitor, then prices might differ across locations and/or be 
priced above marginal cost. In this, case profits need not converge and we would judge the 
markets not to be integrated.  
                                                 
4 We presume throughout the analysis that all banks can meaningfully compared.  Banks specialize so as to fill 
very different niches, then the Stigler reasoning breaks down since effectively the banks would not be 
competing. Hence, we do not control for risk or make any other adjustments to reflect differences in operating 
practices or strategies.    
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Likewise, the models predicated on the Salop and Stiglitz depiction of spatial competition 
also posit entry as an equilibrating mechanism. In that framework, banks choose where to 
locate by spreading out so that the profits are competed down to just cover entry costs. Given 
homogeneity of regulations across the euro area this would also lead to convergence in 
profits.  
Empirically, we look for convergence in the return on assets (ROA) of banks estimating 
variants of the classic partial adjustment equation.5 Under rational expectations we can use 
realised ex-post values as a proxy for expected returns (e.g. Cochrane, 2001) and start with a 
specification of the form 
 
 
In what follows we consider several models of the long run equilibrium profitability, ROA*. 
The actual estimating equation is the differenced form of (1)6: 
 
In principle, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, β, should equal 1-λ. But as 
emphasized by Caballero and Engel (2004), the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of β is 
biased towards zero if changes in profitability are lumpy. The intuition for this econometric 
problem is easiest to see under the extreme case when changes in ROA are always discrete 
and ROA* is a random walk. In this case, the OLS estimate of β can be deduced by 
considering 4 possible terms based on whether the ROA adjusted either at t-1 or t. In three of 
these cases, there was no adjustment in either or both periods so that the covariance between 
the change ROA at time t and t-1 will necessarily be zero. The only time when a correlation is 
possible is when there is adjustment in consecutive periods. Because the t-1 adjustment would 
optimally put ROA at its equilibrium value, there would be no way to predict whether the 
subsequent shocks would involve upward or downward adjustment. So on average these two 
changes will be uncorrelated as well.7 
                                                 
5 An alternative to using banks’ profitability would be to check for convergence in banks’ profit or cost 
efficiency. For a survey of this literature see Hughes and Mester (forthcoming). We present results for one 
alternative measure of bank profitability (ROE) below. 
6 This specification is derived by taking lags of both sides of the equation and taking the difference.  The 
constant term would be zero but as explained in the next footnote, for certain specifications we consider samples 
where the mean adjustment is non-zero by construction.  So we include the constant in all specifications to 
permit comparisons across specifications.    
7 There may be a second problem with estimating equation (2) with OLS, the lagged dependent variable on the 
right hand side may be correlated with the error term (Nickell, 1981).  We discuss some instrumental variables 
estimates that potentially attend to this concern below. 
*
1( )it t it i itROA ROA ROA u vη λ −Δ = + − + +                         (1)
*
1it t it itROA ROA ROA wα λ β −Δ = + Δ − Δ +                          (2)
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Our theory implies that the adjustment mechanism is likely to involve discrete entry and exit 
decisions, so we would expect the change in profitability to exhibit considerable kurtosis. We 
show below that this is indeed the case, so we will infer the adjustment speed from the change 
in the estimated target for profitability and make no attempt to impose a restriction linking the 
coefficients on ΔROA* and the lagged dependent variable. 
This reasoning suggests the following (strong) definition of convergence. 
Strong definition of integration: The world banking market is integrated if there is a common 
ROA* to which all banks converge.  
There are many reasons (including regulatory) that banks in the U.S. and Europe might find it 
difficult to use the same business model in each location. If that is true then pressure from 
banks on the different continents driving convergence may be weak. 
Hence, we also consider weaker definitions of integration. Our second definition requires that 
all banks in the European Union (E.U.) converge to the same equilibrium value of ROA.  
Hence: 
Weak definition of integration: The E.U. banking market is integrated if there is a common 
ROA* to which all E.U. banks converge.  
To clarify the interpretation of the results for integration in the E.U., we also study the 
behaviour of U.S. banks. We do this because the U.S. banking market is generally considered 
to be integrated and (relatively) efficient (although we do test this presumption). Accordingly, 
we compare both the equilibrium value ROA and the estimated speed of convergence for both 
U.S. and European banks. We view the U.S. results as providing both a check of our 
procedure and a quantitative benchmark for the European estimates.  
One useful feature of our framework is that it naturally suggests culprits that might be 
responsible if integration is absent. In particular, besides just estimating (2) for all banks, it is 
informative to check whether the underperforming banks raise their profitability or whether 
highly profitable banks see declines in profits.8 If underperforming banks raise their 
profitability, we would interpret this as evidence in favour of a functioning market for 
corporate control forcing them to improve their performance.9 If highly profitable banks see 
their profits decline quickly, this would be evidence for contestability in banking markets, in 
which the threat of entry or actual entry quickly eliminates rents.  
                                                 
8 We allow the constant in equation (2) for precisely this reason. When estimated on a sample of banks whose 
ROA is either above or below ROA* it would make no sense to omit the constant. So to permit comparisons in 
the full sample estimates we also allow an intercept.     
9 Given that we are estimating continuous albeit lumpy adjustment, we think of the main mechanism as the threat 
of takeover more than a potential takeover itself. 
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These possibilities suggest that it would be useful to conduct the tests controlling for 
differences in contestability or the effectiveness of corporate governance. This leads us to 
estimate ROA convergence separately for different types of banks. Both contestability and the 
market for corporate control should be fully operational for listed banks, while the threat of a 
take over may be considerably weaker for an unlisted bank. Hence, for unlisted banks we 
would expect much slower ROA convergence from below. We would expect adjustment due 
to contestability to be similar for unlisted and listed banks; if we find differences here, this 
would be strong evidence of lack of integration.  
Finally, the tests will be conducted deflating profits by the book value of assets (rather than 
the market value.) There are several reasons for this choice. The structure of the European 
banking sector is one of them. As we show below, the number of listed banks for which we 
could conceivably calculate market values is low in Europe. By limiting our analysis to these 
banks we would miss an important share of the European retail banking sector, especially in 
Germany, where both savings and cooperative banks are important. Indeed, the differences 
between listed and unlisted banks are themselves informative so that ignoring the non-traded 
banks would reduce the power of our tests. Moreover, as a practical matter, proper 
measurement of the market values of banks’ assets would require market values of the loan 
portfolios of banks, which are unavailable. Lastly, the efficiency of stock market valuations 
would force rates of return measured at market prices to converge, irrespective of the degree 
of integration. The point of our procedure is to see operating performance (i.e. the cash flows 
produced by the banks for a given book value of assets) convergences, not whether the stock 
market functions properly. Hence, our measure is only informative about integration when the 
analysis is done using book values.  
4. Data 
 
We confine the study to banks in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, and include U.S. 
banks as a benchmark. We start with all consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data 
for banks in these countries that are available in the Bankscope database. We first eliminate 
all banks that are part of the consolidated balance sheet of another bank. We track banks from 
1994 to 2006. We also eliminate banks with zero or negative total assets, missing post tax 
profits, total customer loans, total deposits, interest earnings and operating expenses. We drop 
banks that had fewer than 4 observations and observations in the bottom or top 2% of the 
change in ROA.  
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The resulting distribution of bank/year observations is given in Table 1. About two thirds of 
the observations are from E.U. countries, with Germany accounting for 46% of the sample 
and the U.S. accounting for just under 1/3. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Data on the type of banks are reported in Table 2. Roughly 40% of the sample consists of 
commercial banks or bank holding companies; below we group these banks along with the 
handful of medium and long-term credit banks and real estate banks into the “commercial 
bank” category. 60% of the commercial banks are U.S. institutions.  
The banks not counted as commercial are savings or cooperative banks. The location of the 
savings and cooperative banks across countries is also very uneven. Almost all cooperative 
banks are either located in Germany (8,813 bank/year observations) and Italy (1,980) 
bank/year observations) and are extremely small. Savings banks are predominantly located in 
Germany (5,981 bank/year observations) and the U.S. (2,414 bank/year observations). 
In Table 3, we present sample statistics for the level and change of ROA. We compute return 
on assets as the ratio of post-tax profits divided by total assets. The mean return on assets is 
0.62%, which is somewhat lower compared to the average value of ROA of 0.8% obtained in 
a very large cross-national sample in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998). The distribution is 
skewed to the right with a median of 0.45%. As one would expect, the mean and the median 
of the first difference of ROA are zero or very close to zero. Importantly, the kurtosis of the 
change in ROA is 8.12, which suggests that the lumpiness concerns discussed by Caballero 
and Engel (2004) are quite relevant.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
When estimating equation (2) we must construct an estimate of ROA*. The essence of the 
Caballero and Engel bias argument is that firm-specific proxies for the target level of 
profitability will still be plagued by the effects of infrequent adjustment. 10 Fortunately, 
                                                 
10 Fama and French (2000) build a firm specific target and use the dividend payout rate, a dummy for dividend 
paying firms and the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  Even if we were to ignore 
the lumpiness issues, these variables would not work well in our context.  For example, we have many non-listed 
firms so we cannot use the market to book ratio.  We did not have complete data on dividend payments available 
either.  Virtually all large listed banks pay dividends and for the unlisted ones the data are not available.  It is not 
clear for the cooperative banks whether dividend payments should be thought of in the usual sense (because the 
banks can pass profits back to their members in other ways such as through lower fees). Further, we are 
interested in whether banks converge to a common target, rather than a firm specific target.  
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aggregate variables can be used to construct a target measure and in our application, the mean 
rate of profitability is a natural candidate target. So we will consider various mean rates of 
profit as the equilibrium target. 
Chart 3 shows the mean rate of returns for all banks in the sample. It is quite clear that there 
are substantial differences in profit rates across the counties in our sample. U.S. profit rates 
are consistently higher than elsewhere and German rates are consistently lower, and until the 
last couple of years of the sample the gap between the two does not narrow. Given the 
different governance mechanisms and profit objectives across banks and the different 
percentages of banks types across countries we do not view these differences as particularly 
informative.  
Chart 4 breaks out the banks into categories that we find more meaningful. The upper panel 
shows the ROAs for the publicly traded banks; there are 699 banks, with three quarters U.S. 
based. These banks presumably have a strong profit motive and are potentially taken over if 
they are poor performers, so that both the necessary pre-conditions for our test hold for these 
institutions. The profit rate distribution, especially in the early part of the sample, is quite 
dispersed.  As in Chart 3, the U.S. banks show persistently higher profits than the others. 
Given the high percentage of U.S. banks in the sample this makes the mean rate for all the 
listed banks higher in every year than the average for each of the European countries. As a 
second point of reference, the dashed line in the chart shows the average for the European 
countries only. By the last few years of the sample the average profit rates narrowed. For 
example, in 1996 the range of average profit rates across countries was 91 basis points, and by 
2006 the range had shrunk to 54 basis points. 
The second panel shows commercial banks that are not publicly traded. These banks are 
supposed to maximize profits but if they are not doing so it may be costly to acquire control to 
correct any underperformance. Again the U.S. banks are noticeably and consistently more 
profitable than their European counterparts. As a reference, we include the average profit rate 
for the listed European banks. While the mean for the listed banks is in the middle of the 
distribution from 2000 onwards, the distribution of profit rates if anything is widening slightly 
over the last 6 years; while in 1999 the difference in average profit rates of the unlisted 
European banks was 26 basis points, by the end of the sample the spread was 43 basis points.  
The last panel shows the profit rates for savings and cooperative banks. A priori these banks 
satisfy neither of our necessary conditions for profit convergence – there are so few of these 
banks in the UK that we omit their average from the picture. Recall that most of the banks in 
the sample are in Germany and the U.S. and through 2003 the movements in the profit rates in 
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these countries appear to be completely disconnected, before converging somewhat in the last 
years of the sample. The ROA in the other three countries also narrowed substantially at the 
end of the sample, but the averages over the prior years were very different.  
5. Convergence Estimates  
 
5.1. Baseline 
We turn now to more formal econometric tests to assess convergence based on estimating 
equation (2) for the three groups of banks in Chart 4. Because the pre-conditions involving 
contestability and corporate control most naturally hold for the listed banks, we begin by 
estimating the equation for them. The first column in Table 4 shows that listed banks profit 
rates move toward the average for all banks in the sample, closing half the gap between their 
own level of profits and the target each year.11 Fama and French in their investigation of non-
financial firms estimated the speed of convergence (to a firm specific mean) to be roughly 0.4. 
The lagged dependent variable has a significant negative coefficient, which based on the 
reasoning on Caballero and Engel is not surprising.12 Consequently in what follows we ignore 
the coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable and concentrate instead on the 
implied estimate for λ from the ROA* proxy. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Based on Chart 4, we know that the average profit rate for the full sample is driven by 
developments in the U.S. Moreover, Chart 4 also tells us that the average in rate in each of the 
European countries lies below the sample average in each year. So based on these 
considerations there are good reasons to doubt the robustness of this initial specification. In 
the second specification in Table 4, we drop the U.S. banks and re-estimate the equation. This 
regression confirms the hunch that the European banks are not tracking the overall sample 
average profit rate. The estimated value for λ is negative and insignificant from zero. Hence 
the apparent convergence from the first specification is entirely due to the U.S. banks and 
there is no evidence that European banks are mirroring their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, the 
strongest version of integration fails. 
                                                 
11 The standard errors are clustered at the bank level throughout our analysis.  If instead we cluster by date the 
standard errors for U.S. samples fall and those for the E.U. samples tend to rise somewhat.   
12 The intuition is as follows.  If the adjustment involves discrete actions and the ROA* has a trend, then the 
periods of inaction will cause that the typical change in the actual ROA to be less than the trend.  Consequently, 
the longer the period in between the adjustments, the larger will be the observed action to catch up.  Without 
making specific assumptions on the stochastic process for the trend we cannot calculate the magnitude of this 
bias.  
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The next two specifications in Table 4 explore weaker tests of convergence, asking whether 
the U.S. banks’ profits move with the average in the U.S. and the European rates move with 
the European average. Both of these tendencies are present. The U.S. banks convergence is, if 
anything, implausibly high, with λ estimated to be 0.85. Taken literally this implies that 
virtually all profit differences are eliminated within one year. We suspect that some of this 
comes from the fact that our sample includes a period substantial consolidation of the U.S. 
banking market, when the largest listed banks took over many of the middle-sized banks that 
had been prominent prior to the possibility nationwide branching - see Jones and Critchfield 
(2005) for survey of overall consolidation trends in the U.S.  
For the European publicly traded banks, we find significant convergence towards the mean 
rate for Europe. The estimated value of λ is 0.33 is plausible and significantly lower than the 
U.S. estimate.13 Thus, European listed banks do appear to be operating in an integrated 
market. 
Non-listed banks have prominent market shares in both the U.S. and Europe. In this sample, 
the percentage of European bank assets residing in listed banks is 53%, while the analogous 
percentage in the U.S. is 47% in 2006. Therefore, the finding of convergence for listed banks 
in the E.U. and U.S. is not a sufficient statistic for the overall state of market integration. So 
we next ask whether the non-traded banks are also moving to towards the average profit rates 
for the listed banks. 
For the U.S. the answer is yes. The non-listed commercial banks show a significant 
propensity to move towards the average rate of profit for their listed competitors. The estimate 
for λ is .431, which is significantly below the rate for listed banks. A lower speed of 
convergence for unlisted banks is not surprising. We expect that in markets where high profits 
are being earned competition among unlisted banks and from listed banks would compete 
down any rents. But, in cases where an unlisted bank is under-performing, taking it over may 
be much more costly than the taking over a poor performing listed bank. This second 
consideration would lead to a lower average speed of convergence. We explore this 
conjecture below.14  
                                                 
13 Not surprisingly, the U.S. listed banks are not converging to the average profit rate of the European banks nor 
are the European banks moving towards the average profit rate for the U.S. banks.   
14 For completeness, the table also includes information on savings and cooperative banks. Remarkably the 
profits of savings banks in the U.S. also tend to converge to the rates of listed banks.  The coefficient for λ is 
1.15. We find this result surprising and puzzling for at least two reasons.  One is that there is abundant evidence 
that savings banks have a fundamentally different business model than commercial banks, especially large 
commercial banks (Critchfield et al (2004)).  The conventional view is that in the U.S. community banks hardly 
compete with large commercial banks.  Moreover, it is often very difficult to take over community banks. Hence 
it is not clear what mechanism would force convergence for these banks. 
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The European results for unlisted banks are strikingly different from the U.S. The estimate of 
λ for unlisted commercial banks is -0.014 and insignificantly different from zero. The 
corresponding coefficient for savings and cooperative banks is -0.06 and significant at the 5% 
level. Hence, there is no indication that the profit rates of unlisted banks in Europe are tied to 
profit patterns for listed banks. Hence, even our weak definition of integration fails for 
unlisted and non-commercial banks in the E.U.  
 
5.2 Further tests  
We next explore whether the mechanisms suggested by our theory appear operative. In 
particular, we ask whether banks whose profits are above ROA* fall (due to competition) and 
whether banks with below target profits improve (due to a threat of a takeover). We view 
these predictions as asymmetric because competition should always be a force to dissipate 
rents, but taking over or restructuring an underperforming bank is costly. So if corporate 
governance changes are associated with a high fixed cost, they may be difficult to implement. 
This is true even for listed banks, as many of the gains of a takeover frequently accrue to the 
shareholders of the existing firm (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Furthermore, cooperative 
banks may not even have a profit maximization motive so if they were recording low profits 
they might have little incentive and no outside pressure to improve. Accordingly in these tests 
we study only commercial banks (listed and unlisted) where there is no ambiguity about the 
management objectives.15   
We refine the basic predictions about the effects of contestability and corporate governance in 
two ways. First, we expect all commercial banks (listed or not) to be subject to competitive 
pressure. Thus, we expect abnormal profits to be competed away for all commercial banks. 
Second, we expect an asymmetry in the effect of corporate governance, with listed banks 
being easier to restructure than unlisted banks.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The first two specifications in Table 5 show the estimates of λ for listed U.S. banks that are 
below and above ROA*. In both cases, λ is significantly positive, although the estimate for 
the underperforming banks is implausibly large. The estimates suggest that competitive forces 
and corporate governance are both operating for these banks.  
                                                 
15 We are ignoring agency problems and corporate governance issues here. 
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The next two columns show the analogous estimates for the E.U. listed banks. Both the 
estimates are close to 0.3, and thus effectively the same as the estimate from Table 4 where 
the speed of adjustment was restricted to be the same in both directions. The standard errors 
are now much larger, so we cannot be confident that the estimates are different from zero. 
Hence, the evidence for contestability and the market for corporate control operating with 
respect to the E.U. mean is relatively weak. One potential explanation is that this is a sample 
size problem: We have data for only about 100 listed banks (and 600 observations) in the E.U. 
as opposed to more than 400 banks (and more than 2000 observations) in the U.S. This 
accurately reflects the limited number of listed banks in the E.U. so there is nothing that we 
can do about this shortage of data.16   
The next pair of estimates shows the results for unlisted U.S. commercial banks. The 
underperforming banks do not seem to raise their profits. Hence, the pressure on poorly 
performing unlisted banks to improve performance through the market for corporate control is 
weaker for unlisted than for listed commercial banks. In contrast, high profit unlisted banks 
do tend to see their rents competed down (and the estimate is significant at the 1% level). This 
pattern is consistent with the view that competitive forces are operative for these banks even if 
there are impediments to a functioning market for corporate control.  
The final estimates in the table show the results for unlisted E.U. commercial banks. The 
estimate for the underperforming banks is insignificantly different from zero suggesting that 
they face no pressure to raise profits. The point estimate for the relatively high profit banks is 
negative (i.e. they tend to move away from the equilibrium value) but insignificantly different 
from zero, implying that competition pressure is also absent. The failure of under-performing 
banks to improve is not surprising, but the absence of competitive pressures among unlisted 
commercial banks is noteworthy. To explore this further we examined whether either finding 
was due to banks in one individual country. This does not appear to be the case, so we do not 
report the results; we obtain the same results as shown for the unlisted European banks when 
we re-estimate the regressions omitting each country.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
                                                 
16 It is important to distinguish between the number of listed banks and their market share. In the U.S. there are 
hundreds of listed banks.  In some European countries, most notably Spain and the UK, there are a relatively 
small number of listed banks operating, but their market share exceeds the market share of listed banks in the 
U.S.  This points to another potential reason for the weaker estimated convergence among European banks: if 
these mega-banks are so large that no domestic institutions can acquire them, then the only potential buyers 
might be outside the country.  If so, the fixed costs involve in turning these banks around will be higher for the 
relevant suitors and the pressure to reform may be weaker. 
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As a final assessment of the unlisted European banks, we re-estimate equation (2) using the 
within-country mean ROA for unlisted commercial banks as ROA*. The results are reported 
in Table 6. The first column shows that profits do converge to these country-specific targets 
profit rates. The estimate for λ is 0.258 and hence is close to the estimate for listed banks 
(from Table 3). The next two columns show that both under-performing and high profit banks 
also converge, although the estimate for the high profit banks is only marginally significant. 17  
When we repeat this test for listed banks we find no convergence, i.e. the profits of listed 
banks in each country do not converge to the average profits of the unlisted banks in that 
country.18 Hence, there appears to be incomplete integration between listed banks on the one 
hand and unlisted banks on the other.  Put differently, we do not find any proxy for target 
profitability that governed both the listed and unlisted European banks, even within countries. 
The overall picture that emerges is one of limited bank integration throughout Europe and of 
incomplete bank integration even within countries in Europe. For the relatively few banks 
whose shares are publicly traded, profit rates do tend to move in tandem and converge to the 
E.U. average rate.  But the vast majority of banks are not listed. These banks’ profits do not 
tend to move in step with the listed banks and instead tend to converge only to a country-
specific target. 
It may be tempting to argue that these results are attributable to the very simple econometric 
specification that we have used. That the same specifications deliver a very different set of 
results in the U.S. suggests otherwise.19  In the U.S. the listed banks profits converge to the 
average level (although at a much faster rate than in Europe). Likewise, the high profit 
unlisted banks also see their profits competed away and they converge to the same profit rate 
as for listed banks. This suggests to us that there is nothing mechanical about our procedure 
that precludes finding integration in a market. 
                                                 
17 If we repeat this exercise for the cooperative and savings banks in Europe their ROAs also converge to the 
within country mean ROA of cooperative and savings banks.  As in the case of the U.S. savings and cooperative 
banks, the estimated coefficients for these regressions seem implausibly large.  
18 To save space we do not show the results, but the point estimate for λ that is analogous to the specification 
shown in the first column of Table 6 is 0.16 with a standard error of 0.345.  
19 We also doubt that the difference in the U.S. and EU results are attributable to other econometric problems. 
For instance, we know that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in regressions of the form as in 
equation (2) is biased.  Phillips and Sul (2003) show that the bias that affects the lagged dependent variable can 
also lead to bias in the coefficient on other variables in the equation.  Unfortunately their results suggest that the 
direction of the bias is a complicated function of several factors which make it difficult to determine even the 
sign of the bias.  We re-estimated equation (2) using the second lag of ΔROA as an instrument for the lagged 
dependent variable. This does alter the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable substantially, usually 
making it closer to zero, but the patterns of convergence across different groups of banks and across regions 
remain robust to this change in estimation procedure. 
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We use ROA as our baseline measure because given differences in taxes alluded to above, 
bank leverage ratios could differ, and hence expected returns on equity could differ.20 As a 
robustness check, however, we also re-estimated the model using return on equity, ROE, 
rather than the return on assets, ROA as our profit measure.    
Table 7 shows the results for the most noteworthy  specifications reported in Tables 5 and 6 
with ΔROEt as the dependent variable and ROE* in place of ROA*. As before, we find 
convergence for listed banks in both the U.S. and the E.U. and convergence of unlisted banks 
to the listed ROE* only in the U.S. Unlisted banks in Europe do not show any convergence 
towards the equilibrium ROE. The difference to the results with ROA are mainly in the speed 
of adjustment of listed banks in the E.U., which is now of comparable magnitude to that of 
listed banks in the U.S. We also confirm the finding that underperforming listed banks adjust 
up and high profit listed banks adjust down in the U.S. and the E.U.  For unlisted banks, high 
profits are competed away in the U.S., but underperforming unlisted banks continue to do so 
in the U.S.  Neither mechanism seems to be operable for unlisted banks in the E.U. All of this 
is consistent with the results for ROA in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
5.3. The role of the euro 
Unfortunately, because we are forced to rely on changes in ROA* to estimate the speed of 
convergence, our short sample does allow us to generate meaningful pre- and post-euro 
estimates. So quantifying any changes in the state of integration that have been associated 
with the introduction of the euro is not possible.21 Nevertheless, the structure of our test 
suggests that competition policy and corporate governance reforms will be needed to promote 
more banking integration. Obviously the common currency does not directly influence either 
of these factors, so any impact of the euro would be through an indirect channel.  
Has the euro had an effect on the ease with which banks can enter markets across countries? 
At first glance, it is difficult to see how the euro could have had a first order impact.  
Regulatory reform during the late 80s and early 90s, and in particular the 2nd Banking 
Directive of 1989, permitted (in theory) the establishment of subsidiaries and branches of any 
bank residing in the E.U. in any other E.U. country. Legally, it eliminated any impediments to 
cross-country banking and cross-country establishments of branches or subsidiaries within the 
E.U. 
                                                 
20 ROA, in contrast, may be affected by the degree to which banks have off-balance sheet operations, while ROE 
would not. 
21 The descriptive evidence (section 4) shows that mean profit rates of listed banks, and for savings and 
cooperative banks converged somewhat across European countries since 2004.  We cannot, however, exclude the 
possibility that the convergence is due to reasons unrelated to the regime shift in monetary policy. 
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What could explain the lack of cross border contestability in this paper? Entry can take place 
through takeovers, the establishment of branches and subsidiaries or the initiation of direct 
cross-border operations. As regards to takeovers, Köhler (2009) presents evidence that 
impediments seem at least to some extent to relate to nationalist motives. Köhler shows that 
opaque merger control procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of foreign ownership of 
a bank especially if this bank is large. Opaque procedures permit more discretion by the 
supervisor or other government authorities in blocking the acquisition of a domestic bank by a 
foreign bank. Prominent recent examples where authorities seem to have thwarted cross-
border transactions include the failed takeovers of Banca Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale 
de Lavoro by foreign banks in Italy or the French reluctance to permit foreign bidders for 
Societe Generale. 22 Clearly, if national authorities are able to block cross-border mergers, this 
may also prevent the market for corporate control from operating efficiently. 
In terms of direct cross-border retail business, the common currency may have been helpful. 
Exchange rate risk has been eliminated and rates and conditions may be easier to compare 
across countries. Retail flows remain small (ECB, 2008), however, although there is a bit of 
evidence of an increase in cross-border retail activity in the vicinity of some borders (Fidrmuc 
and Hainz, 2008). On balance, it seems that there are likely many factors that impede the 
contestability of retail banking markets in Europe.23  
What about the market for corporate control? We already mentioned national objectives that 
may be an obstacle. There is considerable evidence that following the introduction of the euro 
money markets have become integrated (ECB, 2008), which should have equalized the cost of 
funds across countries. Combined with the elimination of exchange rate volatility this should 
facilitate the comparability of rates of returns of banks in different countries. The under- or 
over-performance of a bank, therefore, can be more easily compared and evaluated. In 
addition deeper equity and bond markets permit easier financing of large scale transactions 
(ECB, 2008). Hence, the euro may have improved the corporate governance of listed banks in 
the euro area. Martynova and Renneboog (2006) find that non-financial cross-border 
corporate takeovers did increase in the euro area more strongly than domestic takeovers since 
1998.  Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) present results are consistent with increased cross-border 
competition among bidders for banks in the post-euro era. This is consistent with the rates of 
ROA convergence among E.U. listed banks that we found.  
                                                 
22 See Köhler (2009) for more details on these and other similar episodes involving different countries in Europe. 
23 It is plausible that cultural factors as in Guiso et al. (2004) are important, in particular with respect to retail 
banking services.  We are not aware of systematic evidence on this and other factors affecting cross-border entry 
of markets, however. 
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The effect of increasing profit convergence on financial stability is ambiguous ex ante. The 
usual trade-off between greater diversification of banks’ portfolios (increasing financial 
stability) and the fact that the similarity of the portfolios may increase overall systemic risk 
seems to apply (Wagner, 2009). The integration among listed banks in the E.U. which is 
suggested by our metric is consistent with the evidence in Gropp et al. (2009), who present 
evidence that cross border contagion within Europe may have increased among large listed 
banks. 
However, unlisted commercial banks, savings and cooperative banks constitute about 50% of 
total assets of the banking systems of the major European countries studied here and the retail 
market share may be even larger. The governance of these banks is not subject to the same 
mechanisms as the governance of listed banks. The evidence shows that they neither respond 
to competitive pressures as much as listed commercial banks, nor do these banks face pressure 
to remedy underperformance through a threat of takeover. These rigidities remain in place, 
and as far as we can see would be unaffected by the introduction of the common currency.24  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that tests conducted in the previous literature for retail banking integration 
in the euro area may be misleading. The tests are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions 
for integration and tend to ignore efficiency and equilibrium concepts. We propose an 
alternative that tries to address these shortcomings and we argue that the convergence of the 
return on assets of banks may be a superior measure of banking integration in at least two 
dimensions. One, the return is an equilibrium concept in the sense that it reflects both price 
and quantity effects, as well as demand and supply aspects. Second, the test we propose also 
comes with natural diagnostics that help us interpret what might be responsible for a lack of 
integration.  
Estimates from a partial adjustment model suggest that banking markets in the U.S. 
and Europe are very different. In the U.S. listed and unlisted banks profits converge towards 
the same target level of profitability. For both types of banks, if profitability is above average 
it tends to be pushed back towards ROA*. For unlisted U.S. banks, there is no evidence that 
underperforming banks are pushed towards an improvement in their performance by a threat 
                                                 
24 Hartmann et al. (2006) show that the high share of these banks may have had an adverse effect on growth in 
the euro area, evidence which is consistent with the evidence presented in this paper. 
 21
of a takeover. Hence, for unlisted commercial banks integration fails even in the U.S. due to 
poor corporate control.  
In Europe, only the listed banks appear to be governed by a common ROA*. For unlisted 
banks, we observed substantial differences across European countries in the mean profitability 
(Chart 4) and we find no evidence that unlisted commercial banks converge to a common 
equilibrium value. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly we find evidence not only for impediments 
to a properly operating market for corporate control but also evidence for impediments to 
competition. For unlisted commercial banks in Europe, rents do not tend to get competed 
away. This suggests not only impediments to integration across borders among unlisted 
commercial banks in Europe but also lack of integration within individual countries between 
listed banks and unlisted banks.  
Our approach also highlights the importance to shift attention to mechanisms that permit an 
effective functioning of the market for corporate control and bank entry in a cross-border 
dimension. The paper shows that the large market share of unlisted, savings and cooperative 
banks may be an important impediment to banking integration in Europe. Our estimates also 
suggest focusing more attention on understanding the differences between listed and unlisted 
banks, and more specifically seeking to understand why the two groups are so much more 
different in the Europe than in the U.S. 
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Chart 1. Standard view of financial integration 
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Chart 2. Alternative view of financial integration 
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Chart 4 continued 
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Table 1. Sample country composition 
 
Country Number of Banks  Percent 
Germany  (DE) 17,013 46.61 
Spain (ES) 764 2.09 
France (FR) 2,720 7.45 
United Kingdom (UK) 1,378 3.78 
Italy (IT) 2,686 7.36 
United States (U.S.) 11,940 32.71 
All 36,501 100.00 
 
 
Table 2. Sample bank type composition 
 
Bank Type  Number of Banks Percent
Commercial Bank 1/ 15,645 42.9
Savings Bank 9,271 25.4
Cooperative Bank 11,585 31.7
Total 36,501 100.00
 
Bank type determined based on Bankscope variable ”Specialisation (General)”.   
1/ Includes banks classified by Bankscope as Bank Holding companies, medium and  
long-term credit banks, and mortgage banks. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Kurtosis Num. Obs. 
Return on assets 0.0062 0.0045 0.0058 6.89 36,501 
Change in return on assets 0.00003 0 0.0027 8.12 36,501 
Return on equity 0.084 0.072 0.059 4.19 36,501 
Change in return on equity -0.0005 -0.0006 0.049 21.18 36,501 
Return on assets is Pre-Tax Profits (Bankscope variable I28) divided by Total Assets 
(Bankscope variable A61). Return on equity is Pre-Tax Profits (Bankscope variable 
I28) divided by Total Equity (Bankscope variable L42). 
 
Table 4. ROA convergence 
 
OLS estimates of equation (2) in the text. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level in parentheses. Sample is taken from Bankscope as described in the text. The dependent 
variable is ΔROAt of bank i. ΔROAt-1 is the dependent variable lagged by one period. ΔROA* represents the first difference of the mean of ROA of the regional sub-sample for different 
groups of banks as indicated in the table. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Bank types (Listed, unlisted commercial banks, savings banks and 
cooperative banks) are classified using Bankscope variable Specialisation (General). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Listed banks Unlisted commercial banks Savings banks and Coops 
Proxy for ROA* Overall listed 
mean 
Overall listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed mean U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed mean 
Region All countries All countries 
without U.S. 
U.S. E.U. U.S. E.U. U.S. E.U. 
ΔROA* 
 
0.533*** 
(0.075) 
-0.14 
(0.166) 
0.849*** 
(0.102) 
0.326** 
(0.134) 
0.431*** 
(0.101) 
-0.014 
(0.082) 
1.147*** 
(0.136) 
-0.064** 
(0.030) 
ΔROAt-1 -0.245*** 
(0.019) 
 
-0.245*** 
(0.049) 
-0.242*** 
(0.196) 
-0.241*** 
(0.048) 
-0.189*** 
(0.2) 
-0.158*** 
(0.022) 
-0.15*** 
(0.026) 
-0.304*** 
(0.011) 
Constant 0.00004 
(0.00003) 
 
0.0004*** 
(0.00006) 
0.00009*** 
(0.00003) 
0.0003*** 
(0.00007) 
0.0001*** 
(0.00004) 
0.00006 
(0.00005) 
0.00006 
(0.00006) 
0.000 
(0.00001) 
R2 0.0706 0.0658 0.0813 0.0697 0.0404 0.0246 0.0544 0.0848 
N 5362 1198 4166 1199 5377 5237 2397 18125 
Number of banks 699 164 535 164 666 721 287 2184 
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Table 5. Mean Reversion for Relatively High and Low Profit Banks 
 
OLS estimates of equation (2) in the text. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level in parentheses. Sample is taken from Bankscope as described in the text. The dependent 
variable is ΔROAt of bank i. ΔROAt-1 is the dependent variable lagged by one period. ΔROA* represents the first difference of the mean of ROA of the regional sub-sample for different  
groups of banks as indicated in the table.  Adjustment from below” and “Adjustment from above” refers to sample splits according to whether ROA of bank i was below or above the 
respective sample mean ROA* during period t. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Bank types (listed or unlisted commercial ) are classified using 
Bankscope variable Specialisation (General). 
 
 Listed banks Unlisted commercial banks 
Proxy for ROA* U.S. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
Region U.S. U.S. E.U. E.U. U.S. U.S. E.U. E.U. 
 Adjustment 
from below  
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below  
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below  
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below  
Adjustment 
from above 
ΔROA* 
 
0.922*** 
(0.144) 
0.656*** 
(0.129) 
0.317* 
(0.169) 
0.273 
(0.207) 
0.16 
(0.145) 
0.45*** 
(0.133) 
0.101 
(0.083) 
-0.244 
(0.158) 
ΔROAt-1 -0.254*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.151*** 
(0.034) 
 
-0.274*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.165** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.197*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.115*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.113*** 
(0.030) 
 
-0.146*** 
(0.030) 
Constant 0.0005*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.00005) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.00006) 
 
-0.0004*** 
(0.00006) 
 
0.0005*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.00009) 
 
R2 0.0901 0.0368 0.0842 0.0352 0.0437 0.0166 0.0127 0.0224 
N 2026 2140 629 570 2486 2891 3164 2073 
Number of banks 440 403 127 108 525 536 591 502 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
Table 6. Country-Specific Mean Reversion for unlisted European commercial banks 
 
OLS estimates of equation (2) in the text. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level in parentheses. Sample is taken from Bankscope as described in the text. The dependent 
variable is ΔROAt of bank i. ΔROAt-1 is the dependent variable lagged by one period. ΔROA* represents the first difference of the mean of ROA of the regional sub-sample for different 
groups of banks as indicated in the table. ΔROA* represents the first difference of the country-specific mean of ROA for unlisted banks as indicated in the table. “Adjustment from below” and 
“Adjustment from above” in columns 3 and 4 refers to sample splits according to whether ROA of bank i  was below or above the respective sample mean ROA* during period t. ***, **, * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Unlisted commercial banks are identified using Bankscope variable ”listed institution” and “Specialisation (General)” 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Unlisted commercial banks 
Proxy for ROA* Country-
specific 
unlisted mean 
Country-
specific 
unlisted mean 
Country-
specific 
unlisted mean 
Region E.U. E.U. E.U. 
  Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below  
ΔROA* 
 
0.258*** 
(0.077) 
0.281* 
(0.154) 
0.184** 
(0.081) 
ΔROAt-1 -0.156*** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.140*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.117*** 
(0.031) 
 
Constant 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.00008) 
0.0004*** 
(0.00005) 
R2 0.027 0.0217 0.016 
N 5237 2001 3236 
Number of banks 721 494 603 
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Table 7. Robustness: Return on Equity 
 
OLS estimates of a modified version of equation (2) in the text; the dependent variable is ΔROEt of bank i. ΔROEt-1 is the dependent variable lagged by one period. ΔROE* represents the first 
difference of the mean of ROE of the regional sub-sample for different groups of banks as indicated in the table. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level in parentheses. Sample 
is taken from Bankscope as described in the text. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Bank types (Listed, unlisted commercial banks,) are classified 
using Bankscope variable Specialisation (General).  
 
 
 
 
 Listed banks Unlisted commercial 
banks 
Listed banks Unlisted commercial 
banks 
Listed banks 
 
Unlisted commercial 
banks 
Proxy 
for 
ROE* 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
U.S. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
E.U. listed 
mean 
Region U.S. E.U. U.S. E.U. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. E.U. E.U. E.U. E.U. 
     Adjustment 
from below 
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below 
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below 
Adjustment 
from above 
Adjustment 
from below 
Adjustment 
from above 
ΔROE* 
 
0.775*** 
(0.099) 
0.815*** 
(0.174) 
0.353*** 
(0.127) 
0.090 
(0.096) 
0.663*** 
(0.126) 
0.706*** 
(0.122) 
-0.097 
(0.170) 
0.534*** 
(0.163) 
0.659*** 
(0.221) 
0.655** 
(0.260) 
0.047 
(0.097) 
-0.026 
(0.210) 
ΔROEt-1 -0.357*** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.423*** 
(0.045) 
-0.304*** 
(0.029) 
-0.389*** 
(0.025) 
-0.408*** 
(0.063) 
-0.215*** 
(0.063) 
-0.317*** 
(0.046) 
-0.188*** 
(0.037) 
-0.330*** 
(0.065) 
-0.414*** 
(0.092) 
-0.331*** 
(0.034) 
-0.306*** 
(0.045) 
Constant 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.001 
(0.0007) 
0.005 
(0.0008) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0007) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
-0.024*** 
(0.002) 
R2 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.07 
N 4166 1199 5377 5237 2013 2153 2357 3020 706 493 3677 1560 
Number 
of banks 
535 164 666 721 445 410 512 555 139 113 663 440 
             
